Thesis: Despite a theoretical perfect match between institutional investors and infrastructure investments, allocations to infrastructure have been slow and small. This dissertation investigates using empirical methods the question of how to make a better match between infrastructure investments and institutional investors. The dissertation contributes to the literature on private participation in infrastructure and shifts the debate from private participation in infrastructure as a public policy matter to what is needed to be done from an investment standpoint to unlock the full potential of institutional investors in infrastructure. First, the relation between infrastructure project risks and projects’ attractiveness for institutional investors is investigated. The results highlight that higher macroeconomic, regulatory and political risk can hinder investment by institutional investors. Furthermore, a different risk appetite among direct institutional investors, asset managers and infrastructure funds is found. Second, the role of financial multilateral support in crowding-in institutional investors’ capital into infrastructure is analyzed in developed and developing countries. The results suggest a positive effect in developed countries and a crowding-out effect in developing countries. Finally, an exit and bail-out options mechanism to overcome ex-ante fear of investment in infrastructure is proposed and tested in the lab. Concurrent exit and bail-out options were found to increase partnership formation, cooperative behavior and partnership sustainability compared to situations without exit or unilateral exit from the government only.