Unanimity of two selves in decision making
Pre-print, Working paper: We propose a new model of incomplete preferences under uncertainty, which we call unanimous dual-self preferences. Act f is considered more desirable than act g when, and only when, both the evaluation of an optimistic self, computed as the welfare level attained in a best-case scenario, and that of a pessimistic self, computed as the welfare level attained in a worst-case scenario, rank f above g. Our comparison criterion involves multiple priors, as best and worst cases are determined among sets of probability distributions, and is, generically, less conservative than Bewley preferences and twofold multi-prior preferences, the two ambiguity models that are closest to ours.
Author(s)
Pierre Bardier, Bach Dong-Xuan, Van-Quy Nguyen
Date of publication
- 2024
Keywords JEL
Keywords
- Decision theory
- Incomplete preference
- Multiple-selves
- Non-obvious manipulability
Internal reference
- PSE Working Papers n°2024-19
Pages
- 41 p.
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1