Une preuve alternative de l’existence d’un équilibre de Nash dans les jeux discontinus
Journal article: This Note presents a theorem of the existence of the Nash equilibrium for discontinuous games in a topological vector space. We will use an assumption of better reply secure which is stronger then that of Reny. If the payoff function is upper semi-continuous, the two assumptions coincide. Our proof is simple, independent and based on a version of Fan-Browder theorem of existence of maximal element due to Deguire and Lassonde, which is extended to the non-Hausdorf case.
Author(s)
Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Pascal Gourdel, Hakim Hammami
Journal
- Comptes rendus de l’Académie des sciences. Série I, Mathématique
Date of publication
- 2009
Keywords
- Fixed points
- Discontinuous payoff
- Non-Hausdorf space
- Secured payoff
Pages
- 701-704
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1
Volume
- 347