Une preuve alternative de l’existence d’un équilibre de Nash dans les jeux discontinus

Journal article: This Note presents a theorem of the existence of the Nash equilibrium for discontinuous games in a topological vector space. We will use an assumption of better reply secure which is stronger then that of Reny. If the payoff function is upper semi-continuous, the two assumptions coincide. Our proof is simple, independent and based on a version of Fan-Browder theorem of existence of maximal element due to Deguire and Lassonde, which is extended to the non-Hausdorf case.

Author(s)

Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Pascal Gourdel, Hakim Hammami

Journal
  • Comptes rendus de l’Académie des sciences. Série I, Mathématique
Date of publication
  • 2009
Keywords
  • Fixed points
  • Discontinuous payoff
  • Non-Hausdorf space
  • Secured payoff
Pages
  • 701-704
Version
  • 1
Volume
  • 347