Until Death Do Us Part? The economics of short-term marriage contracts
Pre-print, Working paper: Until death do us part". Common wisdom considers that marriages will last forever, as the default length of a marriage is the total remaining lifespan of the spouses. This paper aims at questioning the prevailing marriage contracts, by exploring the conditions under which short-term contracts would be more desirable. Using a two-period collective household model, we show that, under a large interval of values for household production technology parameters and individual preference parameters, short-term marriage contracts, if available, would dominate long-term contracts. Moreover, the recent equalization of bargaining power within the household is shown to make short-term contracts even more desirable than in the past.
Keywords JEL
Keywords
- Marriage contracts
- Collective household model
- Length of marriage
- Household production technology
Internal reference
- PSE Working Papers n°2010-24
URL of the HAL notice
Version
- 1