Economics for everybody: Elections and voting methods by Antonin Macé

Research in this theme covers topics such as model uncertainty and direct strategy restrictions in games; analogy-based expectations; equilibrium with coarse feedbacks in repeated games, communication games, signaling games and auctions…
Research in this theme covers topics such as existence and refinements of Nash and Subgame perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games, with applications to bargaining; coalition formation as a bargaining process, with applications to the formation of coalitional government in political economy; farsighted rationality and chains of domination…
Research in this theme covers topics such as dynamic general equilibrium models with altruistic agents, and applications to political recommandations and efficient lockdown in case of an infectious disease; optimization techniques without convexities, augmented Bellman principles and recursive functionals in dynamic programming…
Research in this theme covers topics such as aggregation of incomplete preferences, leading to a new approach to recommended system widely used by platforms on the internet; design of collective-decision procedures (apportionment methods in federations, storable votes in committees, approval voting in general elections, voting rules for shareholder meetings, participatory democracy)…
Research in this theme covers topics such as dynamic matching models inspired by the assignment of social housing, high school teachers and administrative positions; assignment methods based on the accumulation of seniority points, contrasting different assignment methods and using queuing theory to construct optimal mechanisms; assignment of temporary property rights (such as hotel rooms and rental cars)…
Research in this theme covers topics such as the use of networks to elicit information about agents’ characteristics, either by constructing mechanisms where agents report on their neighbors or mechanisms where agents reveal their position in a network; “network interdiction” pitting an attacker (whose objective is to capture nodes) against a defender (who protects nodes and designs the network)…